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1. In the nineties, the world economy  is experiencing  a  dramatic  change.  Communi-
cation  costs  and  transport  costs  are  falling,  market  segmentations  are  being  re-
duced,  markets are  globalized and become more  contestable,  competition  is  getting
more  intensive,  value  added  chains  are  sliced  up,  production  is  being  fragmented
and  is  reallocated  on  a world-wide  scale.  This  is  one  line  of  change  in the  world
economy.  The  other  line  of  change  is  that  major  regions  of  the  world  economy,
China  and  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  which  up to  the  late  eighties  were  more  or
less secluded from the  international  division of labor,  now are being  reintegrated  in
the world  economy,  a  quarter  of the world  population.  This  second  aspect  is  our
topic,  looking  at  the  reform  countries,  the  new  market  economies  of  Central  and
Eastern Europe.
2.  Talking  in terms of an  economic model,  the opening  up of the post-communist-re-
form  countries  can  be  understood  as  an  exogenous  shock  to  the  world  economy
which  requires  an  adjustment  to  find  a  new  equilibrium.  It is  a  supplv  shock  in  the
sense that the factor endowment of the international  community  of nations  changes;
more  people,  i.e.  more  labor,  more  space,  and to  some  extent  more  capital,  mostly
obsolete  physical capital,  is  added.  It is a  market shock in the  sense that  new  mar-
kets  are  opened  up.  This  change  in  relative  factor  endowments  and  in  additional
"demand"  potential  is occurring simultaneously with the melting  away  of market  seg-
mentation.
3. In my paper I address four different  points:
How quickly can we expect the reform countries  to catch  up?
- Which trade flows  are likely to develop in the years to come?
How relevant are factor movements?
- To what extent can institutional arrangements  foster re-integration?
Of course,  all four issues are  interrelated,  for instance  the  rate  of economic growth
will  depend  on  trade  and  on  the  institutional  arrangements,  and,  in turn,  economic
growth will influence trade.
*  I  appreciate  comments  from  the  participants  of  the  symposium,  especially
Ulrich  Koester and  Stefan  Tangermann  as well  as from  Ralph  Heinrich  and  Jurgen
Stehn.4.  Our topic is in a flux,  in a process of development. This can best be seen from  the
phenomenon that even the names for the new region of Europe  are still  shifting:  We
talk  of  the  reform  countries,  the  new  market  economies,  the  Visegrad-4  and  the
Visegrad-5,  the  CEFTA  members  (i.e.  the  members  of the  Central  European  Free
Trade Association)  - there  are five -,  the  CEECs,  the Central  and  Eastern  Euro-
pean  Countries - there are  ten -,  the  EEC's,  the Europe  Agreement  Countries  -
again ten  -,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  including  Russia  and  the  former  Soviet
bloc, and the 30 post-communist countries of the world economy which are  all  in  the
process of transformation.
I. Catching Up
5.  Where  do  the  reform  countries  stand?  The  new  market  economies  of  central
Europe,  the Visegrad-5, have passed the valley in the J-curve  of transformation,  with
Poland surpassing the pre-reform  level of 1989-GDP  and the other  most progressed
countries reaching  90 percent of the initial level. A different  story holds  for the CIS-
countries with Russia at fifty percent of the starting position  and for the  Baltic states
with  a similar pattern  except  Estonia.  Note,  however, that these  intertemporal  com-
parisons  have  to  be  interpreted  with  great  caution because  the  statistical  basis  of
comparison,  the year 1989,  is likely to be distorted. 1
The most  progressed  countries,  the Visegrad-5 (Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Poland,
Slovak  Republic and Slovenia),  have reached roughly 40 percent  of the EU-15  level
in per capita GDP,  30 percent of the West German  level.
6.  From  the  literature  on  catching-up  processes,  we  know  that  catching  up  takes
time,  a lot of time.  In a simplified notion,  the catching-up country  is walking  down the
marginal  productivity curve of capital. With more  capital per worker  accumulated,  the
marginal  productivity of capital falls and the growth  rate  is reduced.  Eventually,  if ab-
solute convergence can  be applied,  it will  reach the  same steady state as  a  country
in Western  Europe.  According to  the  Barro  rule,  GDP-differences  in  per  capita  be-
tween  regions  of the Unites  States  have been  leveled  in  at  a  rate  of 2 percent  per
year  over  one  hundred  years,  in  the  period  1880-1988  (Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin
1991).  Among  the OECD  countries this rate  is only 1 percent in the post war period.
In Western Europe, the rate of convergence  is somewhere  between  1  and 2  percent.
Can we apply these results to the reform countries?
7. Estimates on growth rates for the reform countries of Central  Europe differ widely.
Let  us look at the Visegrad-5. According to  Baldwin  et al.  (1997)  "most  ...... predict
growth  rates  that are  two  or  three  times those  of Western  Europe"  (p.  129).  This
would  be  a  growth  rate  of 5-7  percent  or  even  more.  Others  are  less  optimistic.
Sachs  and  Warner  (1996)  point  out  that  the  new  market  economies  of  Eastern
Europe  differ  significantly from  the  four or  six tigers  in  South-East  Asia  with  real
growth rates for two decades of 6-7 percent, namely in two decisive points:
First, the  savings  and  investment  ratio  to  GDP  is  much  lower  in  central  Europe
with  23,5  percent  in  the  nineties  (Czech  Republic,  Poland,  Slovak  Republic,
1 For measurement issues  in centrally  planned economies  in the older literature  see the discussion  on
the  Gerschenkron effect (1955).
2Slovenia)  to 35-36 percent in the quickly expanding countries  in  South  East Asia
(Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Singapore, Thailand).
Second,  the share of government in  GDP with 60 percent  in the  reform  countries
is much higher than in  South  East Asia.
Consequently,  a  lower growth rate,  let us say of 3.5 percent,  may be expected.  Note
that the share of government  in  GDP  is not to  be confounded with  the share of pro-
duction that has been privatized which is roughly 70 percent.
8.  Of course,  the  growth  rate  will be  crucial for convergence.  If we  assume  that the
Visegrad-5 have a growth  rate of 5 percent and the EU-15  of 2.5 and if we evaluate
their  initial  position at  40 percent  of GDP  per capita  relative  to  Western  Europe,  it
will take 37 years to  reach the same level in per capita output and  a quarter century
- 22 years - to halve the distance. This  presumes a permanent  growth  difference
of 2.5 percentage points.  If the  growth  rate  in  Eastern  Europe  would  only  reach  3.5
percent  and  if the  permanent  growth  differential  were  only  1  percentage  point,  it
would take  nearly a century - 92  years - to  reach the same  level  and more  than
half a century - 56 years - to halve the distance.
Note that much more  time  is needed for the convergence of other countries  like  Bul-
garia,  Romania and Russia all of which start at a much  lower level.
II.  Trade  Flows
9.  In order to answer the question of which trade  flows will  develop, we  can  look  to
trade theory. Which story would theory tell us?
Gravity  Models  allow  predictions  on  the  volume  of  trade,  suggesting  that  geo-
graphical distance is an  important factor; trade occurs  between countries that are
geographically close. This type of interregional  trade  can be expected to be  rele-
vant for  the  reform  countries  vis-a-vis  Western  Europe.  Also  market  size  as  a
mass factor  is  relevant. Gravity models,  however, do  not allow predictions on the
product mix (Winters and Wang 1994,  Baldwin et al.  1997).
- Early  in  the  transformation  process  when  the  international  exchange  was  still
minimal,  historical patterns were studied in order to find clues for the product  mix
of trade flows (Collins and Rodrick 1991).  Pre-World War  II trade  patterns served
as  an  indicator for future  trade  patterns.  Thus,  it was  stressed  that  Czechoslo-
vakia was one of the leading industrialized regions in Europe in the 30s.
Relative endowments  as predictors of trade flows would  indicate that the  reform
countries specialize in the  production and  export of products which  require  their
relatively abundant  factors  of production,  i.e.  land  and  labor. Although  labor  is
less skilled relative to Western  Europe,  it is generally  agreed that labor  in some
Eastern  European  countries  predisposes  of relatively high  qualifications. There-
fore, we  can  expect that labor-rich  countries will  export labor-intensive products,
but also human-skill-intensive products. At the moment,  and for some time,  how-
ever, Eastern  Europe would be expected to embody  less  human capital in  its ex-
ports than Western  Europe.  Some countries, for  instance  the Visegrad-5,  can  be
expected  to export more  skill-intensive  products than the other CEECs.
Intra-industry  trade  postulates that trade  takes  place  in  similar products,  due  to
economies  of scale and due to  a  preference  for differentiated  products,  i.e.  to  alove for variety. With income per capita approaching each other,  with preferences
being  or  becoming  similar  due  to cultural  nearness  and  with  similar  production
technologies being  applied,  intra-industry  trade  is likely  to  play  a greater  role  in
the  future.
- Finally, networks in  the value added chain,  i.e. a hub and spoke system between
Western and Central Europe,  including a  fragmentation of production,  can  be ex-
pected.  This would also include  intra-firm trade.
10.  So  much for theory.  Seven years  into  the transformation  process,  the empirical
picture of the international division of labor already tells us quite a  lot. As a matter of
fact,  it tells exactly what theory would predict.  I must admit that  I was quite  surprised
when I saw the data. And I had to correct quite a few prejudices.
- Exports of the reform countries amount to roughly 27 percent of their GDP (for the
Visegrad-5  countries  in  1996).  They  have  reached  degrees  of openness  com-
parable to  Western  European  Countries  (Gros and  Gonciarz  1996).  This  means
that these countries are quite outward oriented.
- The  share of exports going to  the  EU  relative to  total  exports  is  roughly  66 per-
cent so  that the  reform  countries  are  integrated  into  the  EU  with  a  similar  per-
centage  as  the  EU-members;  in  terms  of  trade,  they  are  de  facto  already  EU
members.  The EU-market  is critical for the reform countries (Baldwin  et al.  1997).
- Meanwhile,  the  market  of  the  reform  countries  is  becoming  important  for  the
European  Union  with  8.4  percent of  EU's  exports  (extra  EU-exports);  for  some
countries,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  is  an  especially  interesting  market.  Ger-
many  accounts  for  53.6  percent  of  the  EU-exports  to  the  reform  countries
(Visegrad-5).  Germany exports 7 percent of its total  (i.e.  both intra-and  extra-EU)
exports to Central and Eastern  Europe.
11.  This  basically confirms  gravity models. What  is the empirical  picture  on the  pro-
duct  mix?  In  trade  between  the  EU  and  the  CEECs-10,  in  two  product  categories,
namely  in  "chemicals  and  rubber  and  plastic  goods"  and  in  "other  machines  and
equipment",  the EU  is a  net exporter  (Baldwin et al.  1997). There  is  only a slight net
surplus  in  transport  equipment  whereas  the  CEECs  have  a  net  surplus  in  "other
manufactures". This suggests that the EU  has a comparative advantage  in capital- or
technology-intensive products (and  the CEECs-10  in labor-intensive "other manufac-
tures").  It is quite  surprising,  however,  that  all  the  other  product  groups,  trade  be-
tween the EU  and the reform  countries is more  or less balanced, namely in food  and
agricultural  products,  other  primary goods,  textiles,  clothing  and footwear,  iron  and
steel and  semi-processed goods.  This means that in  there  is already quite  a  lot of
intra-industry trade.
Ill. Factor Movements
12. When,  in  1989, the  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  opened  up,
segmentations of factor  markets  were  reduced  considerably.  This  implies  that  a
reallocation of  factors of  production is  likely to take  place.
The  opening  up of new regions means  new investment  opportunities.  If uncertainties
for  investors  can  be  kept  low,  the  new  regions  will  attract  capital.  The  Visegrad-4
have  attracted  an accumulated  stock of foreign  direct investment  of 33  bill.  US-$  asof  July  1996  (UN  Economic  Commission  for  Europe  1996)  which  translates  into
roughly 500  US  $ per capita  or 13  percent of GDP.  For  Hungary  and  Slovenia,  this
ratio  is much higher, for instance 31  percent of GDP for Hungary.
Hungary,  Slovenia and the  Czech  Republic have  reached  FDI  levels  comparable  to
those of emerging  markets  in  Latin  America  and  in Asia.  Foreign  direct  investment
accounted for roughly 10 percent of total  investment in  1993/94 in  the Czech Repub-
lic  and  in  Poland,  and  reached  33.6  (1993)  and  18.4  (1994)  for  Hungary.  These
levels,  not  in  line with  the findings  in the  Feldstein-Horioka2 (1980)  tradition,  are  of
course corrections of the isolation  in the  last 50 years from the world  capital  market.
It can be expected that capital inflows will not, however, continue at the current  level.
An  important  condition for  capital  inflows  is that  political  uncertainty  is  further  re-
duced.  Of course,  integration with the EU would  be a major event  in  reducing  uncer-
tainty.3
13.  We cannot exclude that in the future capital inflows may temporarily  die down  or
even  reverse,  and  balance-of-payments  crises may  ensue.  Witness  the  Czech  Re-
public in  1997 (Buch  and  Heinrich  1997).  Countries  may get  into  a  credibility  crisis
due to an unconvincing stability policy.  High absorption  relative  to domestic  produc-
tion, wage increases surpassing  productivity growth,  short-termism  of economic  pol-
icy,  social  policies,  budget deficits  and  government  debt,  distributional  targets  and
populist  policies  all  may  be  a  cause for  instability  implying  a  depreciation  of  the
home currency, lower capital inflows and a lower growth  rate of production  potential.
14.  Differences  in  net wages  between  Poland  and  the Czech  Republic  on  the  one
hand and Germany on the other hand are  now (1996)  estimated to be1  : 5 at market
rates;  they were  1 : 10 at some interval  in the transformation  process.  In purchasing
power  parity,  net wages  in Poland and the Czech  Republic are  put at 40 or even 45
percent of the German  level.  For other countries such as Romania  or Russia, wages
at market  rates reach only 10 or 8 percent of the German  level,  respectively (and  15
percent at purchasing  power parity).
Income differences are  under normal  conditions a factor that leads to the  movement
of people.  We  know,  however,  that  it  is  not only  income  differences  in  the  Harris-
Todaro  tradition  (1970)  that can explain  migration.  The decision to  migrate  must  be
understood  as  an  intertemporal  maximization  problem  where  the  potential  migrant
searches for  a  maximum  life time  income,  i.e.  he  maximizes  the  expected  present
value of his income during his life (Siebert  1993).  Migration  is to  be compared  to  an
investment decision. As a matter of fact, it is an  investment relating to human capital.
Consequently,  expectations  on  how  a  migrant's  future  income  will  develop  both
abroad and at home come into play. If it can be expected that the economic situation
at home will improve, the incentive to migrate  is reduced. In that case there is a posi-
tive option value of waiting because, over time, differences  in  income per capita will
become smaller.
2 According to their findings, the world capital market only bridges excess demand and excess supply
of individual countries, but by and  large investment of a country has to be financed through national
savings.
3 An interesting  point  is made  by Baldwin  et al.  (1997).  Uncertainty for private  investment in the
reform  countries  still  ires a high  risk premium.  Becoming  a  member of the European  Union
reduces these risks because the reform  countries would  bind their economic policy. Baldwin  et al.
calculate the reduction  in  risk premium  as 45 basis points.15.  Data  on East-West  migration  including temporary work are sketchy  and anecdo-
tal. There  are several salient features (Table Al).
- First,  migration  generally  picked  up  after  the  onset  of  reforms,  reflecting  both
more  open frontiers and the uncertainty of Central  Europeans  about the outcome
of economic reforms  as well  as large  income differentials.  As  a  result,  the share
of former citizens of the  CEEC-6-countries  plus Russia  in  the foreign  population
of Germany was  8  percent  in  1996,  up  from  5.7  in  1988,  reaching  9  percent  in
1993.
- Second,  migration started  to subside after  1992/93.  This  is probably  due to Cen-
tral  and  Eastern  Europeans  realizing that reforms  in  their  countries  are  for  real,
with  first  successes  beginning  to  show  (hence  the  option  value  of  waiting  in-
creased),  but also due to tighter German regulation of inward  migration.
- Third,  migration  from  the poorest and most  sluggish reformers,  Bulgaria  and  Ro-
mania,  has been  highest  in  relative terms.  The number  of Bulgarian  and  Roma-
nian residents in Germany rose by a factor of 9 to  12,  respectively,  between  1988
and  1993.  The  share  of  Polish  people,  of  Hungarians  and  CSFR-nationals  re-
mained  relatively stable.
- Fourth,  for Russians, migration has not yet started  to subside,  which  is consistent
with the ongoing economic crisis and political instability in that country.
This seems to confirm migration theory: the larger the income  difference  and the less
promising the option of waiting,  the stronger is the incentive to migrate.
16.  Of  course,  a  completely  free  movement  of  workers  between  Eastern  and
Western  Europe  does  not exist.  We can  only speculate on  the amount  of  migration
that would prevail if people could  move freely.  In any case, migration  would  become
smaller over time.  Forecasts  of migration to  be expected  are  highly  speculative.  Mi-
gration  scenarios  (Deutsches  Institut  fur  Wirtschaftsforschung  1997)  estimate  the
migration potential  of the Visegrad-5 until 2030 at 5 million  (with an actual  population
of 66 million) in a  low migration scenario, and the migration  potential  of the  CEEC-10
at 10  million (with an actual population of 105 million).
17.  The  additional supply  of labor  in the  new region  to  be  integrated  into the world
economy  will  have  its  repercussions  on  the  EU-15  countries.  A  rather  simple
analysis  can  be  undertaken with  the concept  of the factor  price frontier.  The factor
price  frontier  is  the  combination  of  factor  prices  (for  capital  and  labor)  that  are
possible  with  a  given  technology.  Thus,  the  maximum  real  wage  is  a  declining
function  of the  real  rate  of  return  on  capital.  A  specific point  on  the  factor  price
frontier  represents  a  factor  market  equilibrium  with  full  employment  of  labor  and
capital.  Consider  now  the  factor  price frontier  of Western  Europe.  With  additional
labor  being  available  in  Western  Europe  due  to  migration,  the  equilibrium  relative
factor price  has to  change;  i.e. under ceteris paribus conditions the  real wage  must
come down (relative to the real interest rate).  Labor in Western  Europe comes under
pressure.  Over  time,  the  frontier  may  shift  outward,  induced,  for  instance,  by
technological efficiency gains from trade (Siebert 1997).
18.  If the  movement of people  is considered  undesirable, it  is  not sufficient to erect
obstacles  against  the  mobility  of  workers.  It is  necessary  to  reduce  the  economic
pressures which  will  imply  migration.  As water follows the  law of  gravity,  people  will
follow economic opportunities. One important mechanism  that can ease the pressureis  capital  mobility.  Here,  it  is  in  the  own  interest  of the  new  market  economies  to
make themselves attractive for foreign capital. As they succeed  in  luring capital from
abroad, they  improve the  productivity and wages of their workers  and reduce  the  in-
centive to migrate.  They must  also aim to  raise the savings rate  at home.  The  other
mechanism  is  to make. exports  more  competitive;  this,  in  turn,  can  be brought  about
by the  EU  opening  up  its  product  markets.  If this  is  done,  real  income  in  the  new
market economies can rise, and again, the advantage of migrating  becomes smaller.
Thus,  there  is a cascade of adjustment  mechanisms.  Ceteris  paribus,  i.e.  if nothing
else  is  done,  people will  have  a  strong  incentive to  move.  This  mechanism  will  be-
come  less  important  if capital  can  be attracted,  and even  less  if product  markets  in
the European Union are completely opened up.
IV. Institutional and  Policy Aspects
19.  Finally I look at some issues of institutional  economics and at the political  econ-
omy of enlargement. Where are major obstacles for enlargement? How important are
these obstacles?
Enlargement of the Internal Market
20.  Except for agricultural and sensitive products,  regional integration  is  already tak-
ing place due to the Europe agreements with ten reform countries,  that is the individ-
ual members of the Visegrad-5 (and not the CEFTA,  their free trade association),  the
Baltic States,  Romania and  Bulgaria.  The agreements  more or less establish  a free
trade  zone  with  the  EU  in  which  tariff  obstacles  and  quantitative  restrictions  are
largely abolished.  In addition,  the Visegrad-5  have established  their own  free  trade
area,  the CEFTA.
21.  One major remaining  problem for Europe Agreement  Countries  is that  country  of
origin  procedures  still  hamper  trade;  this  is  especially  relevant  since  the  reform
countries continue to have a higher external tariff than the  EU with  6 percent for the
Visegrad-4  against  3.6 of the  EU.  Moreover,  external  tariffs  rates  differ  (Poland  9,
Hungary 6.9, Czech  and Slovak Republic 3.8).  In addition, the Europe treaties do  not
rule out that the  European  Union  may  use escape clauses and anti-dumping  proce-
dures if imports from  Middle and Eastern  Europe  are  large and if economic positions
in the EU come under pressure. Thus, there remains a protectionist risk.
22.  With  respect  to  commodity  trade,  except  agriculture,  however,  enlargement
should not represent  major  problems.  Opposition  in the  European  Union should  be
small and  even  negligible for  a number  of reasons. Enlargement  has  already been
prepared  by the Europe treaties.  Since trade is to  a considerable part intra-industry
trade,  trade  liberalization  (and  regional  integration  with  the  European  Union)  can
lead  to  increased  production  in  the  same  sector  in  both  the  EU  and  the  reform
countries;  this  means  that  opposition  to  liberalization  should  not  be  too  strong.
Moreover, with  foreign  direct  investment  coming  from  Western  Europe,  it  is  partly
west European  capital that exports to Western  Europe.
23.  Another  issue  is whether the  "acquis communautaire"  is  appropriate  for the  re-
form  countries  and  to  what  extent  it will  hinder  economic  growth  and  reduce  em-
ployment.  Moreover,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  reform  countries,  the  European
Union  is  somewhat  closed  to  the  world  market  in  some  product  lines  using  anti-dumping  measures  as  a  protectionist  device.  These  may  be  areas  in  which  the
CEECs  have (or will  have)  a comparative  advantage  on a global  scale.  Their  infant
industry  would  thus  not  be  exposed  to  international  competition;  viewed  from  the
CEECs,  the  EU  follows  more  the  Latin  American  pattern  than  the  Asian  road  of
export orientation  in these  product  lines.  Therefore,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that the
reform  countries  must  be  interested  in  a  multilateral  integration  as  well.  Regional
integration with the EU should not go against multilateral integration.
24.  With  respect to  benefits from  an  intensified  division  of  labor,  simulation  studies
indicate that all countries,  i.e. the EU  and the reform countries,  will  benefit from  inte-
gration.  Theory would tell us that the small countries gain  more because they experi-
ence  the  larger  relative  price  changes.  Indeed,  simulation  studies  indicate  that  the
CEECs gain relatively more (Baldwin  et al. 1997).
25. Whereas  trade  and the  movement of capital do  not seem  to  create  major  prob-
lems  in the case of enlargement,  four problem areas  exist:  the free  movement  of  la-
bor, common  agricultural policy, cohesion policy and the voting rules.
An Exemption for the free movement of labor
26. A first stumbling block is migration.  Even though migration pressure  seems  to be
smaller than feared initially, with the existing wage differences between  Western and
the  most  progressed  Middle  and  Eastern  European  countries  enlargement  cannot
immediately include the free  movement  of  labor.  This  important  freedom  has  to  be
phased  in  over time.  Keeping  in  mind  that convergence  is  a  very slow  process and
that income per  capita can be expected to differ for quite some time,  the transitional
period  cannot  be  short,  i.e.  it  should  be  in  the  range  of  10-15  years.  Possibly,
quotas defining  the right of entry to a national  labor market  in  Western  Europe  have
to  be  used;  these  quotas,  which  can  be  auctioned  off  in  the  new  EU-member
countries, should increase over time.
It must  be pointed  out that it will be  difficult to delineate the  (permitted)  exchange of
commodities  from  the  (not  permitted)  movement  of workers.  The  dividing  line  be-
tween  these forms  of interaction  is blurred,  and people will  use their  imagination  to
find forms  of trade flows which  are close substitutes to  the  mobility of people.  Sub-
contracting in the construction industry is a well known example.
Common Agricultural Policy
27.  The  second  major  stumbling  block for  EU-enlargement  is  the  common  agricul-
tural policy. It is true that since 1992 an  attempt has been  made with  the MacSharry
reform  in the European  Union to bring price floors somewhat  more  in  line with  world
market  prices-paying compensations  per unit of land and also per head  of cattle or
sheep (as a means of income).  These compensation payments are, however, not yet
uncoupled from  production.  Moreover, compensation  should have been  conditioned
to the development of world market  prices. Possibly, the  EU will come under greater
pressure  in  the  WTO  negotiations  starting  in  1999  to  further  reduce  production-
stimulating compensations, especially after the US  has abolished its deficiency pay-
ments in  1996.
In  any  case,  CAP  is  still  a  mechanism  producing  excess supply  relative  to  market
conditions.  If this  mechanism  is extended  to  the  reform  countries  we  can  expect  a
sizable increase  in  the  productivity  of the agricultural  sector there,  especially  since
these  countries  tend  to  produce  the  heavily  subsidized  "northern"  products.  It isapparent that an extension of CAP to Central  and Eastern  Europe  in  its existing form
will add to the already existing inefficiency and require  additional funds.  Estimates  of
yearly additional budget costs of an enlargement  by the Visegrad-4  countries  range
from  4 billion  ECU  to 37 bill.  ECU  (Baldwin  et al.  1997,  Tangermann  1997).  Baldwin
et al.  (1997,  p.  154) put the consensus estimate at 10  bill.  ECU. Tangermann  (1997)
expects CAP expenditure for the CEEC-4  to be around  13 bill.  ECU  in 2005  (in  1993
prices).
28.  It seems there are two  options for agricultural  policy in enlargement.  One  is that
the  agricultural  policy of the  EU  is  reformed  before  enlargement  takes  place.  The
other option  is  to  exclude agriculture  from  enlargement  completely  or  to  practice  a
phased-in  enlargement for agricultural products.  The problem  with  such a waiver  for
agricultural  products  or  a  phasing  in  is  that  agricultural  production  would  operate
under  different  conditions  in  two  parts  of  an  enlarged  European  Union.  One  ap-
proach  would  be  to  have  different  prices  using  border  controls.  This  would  be  a
severe obstacle to a common  market  in the non-agricultural  goods.  The other  option
would  be to  practice  a different  approach  to agricultural  policy  in  the  new  member
countries  in  applying  other  policy  instruments  there,  such  as  quantity  controls  of
production.  It  is  difficult  to  envisage  quantity  controls  on  production  in  the  new
member  countries;  it  is  equally  difficult  to keep farm income in  the CEECs low  by
other instruments  (such as producer price reductions  in case of oversupply).  To sum
up,  a  reform  of  the  European  Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  a  precondition  for
enlargement;  at  the  minimum,  a  reform  should  be  credibly  under  way  before
enlargement begins.
Setting such  a condition  cannot mean that the agricultural  lobby is  put  into the posi-
tion of preventing  the  enlargement  of the  European  Union.  Care  must  be  taken  to
prevent  an  increased  threat  potential  of  the  agricultural  sector  in  the  political
bargaining of enlargement.
Cohesion and Structural Funds
29. The  extension of cohesion  policy to the  CEECs  is  another hard  nut.  The  struc-
tural  fund (European  Fund for Regional  Development,  European  Social  Fund,  Euro-
pean Agriculture  Fund with an annual budget  1997:  24.0 bill.  ECU)  and the cohesion
fund (annual budget 1997: 2.5 billion ECU)  account for 29 percent of the EU-budget,
that is  0.4 percent of GDP of the  EU-15.  Projecting the actual  rules for transfers  im-
plies that the new potential  members  of the European  Union would  receive transfers
for  decades.  Estimates  for  the  Visegrad-4  countries  range  from  26  bill.  ECU
(Courchene  1993) to  13 billion per year (Baldwin  et al.) for the structural fund alone.
This amounts to 0.2 to 0.4 percent of EU-GDP.  Other estimates are higher (33 billion
ECU  for the CEFTA countries, Deutsches Institut for Wirtschaftsforschung  1997).
30. The  political economy  of transfers  suggests that enlargements  have  been  used
in the past also to extend the transfer items and the transfer budget. Before enlarge-
ment, due to unanimity, the yes-vote of those countries who are current recipients of
transfers  and  who  may  lose  their  income  per capita  status  is  needed;  thus  it  has
been estimated that 45 million people in Western  Europe would lose their objective 1
status  in the  structural fund due  to a changed  average  of an  enlarged  union.  Since
these  countries  have  to  agree  to  an  enlargement  they  demand  compensation  for
future losses. If they are successful, the actual programs will be extended.After  enlargement  "the  poor-4  will  become  the  poor-9"  - as  Baldwin  et  al.  put  it
(1997,  p. 165).  Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal,  Spain, the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Po-
land, Slovakia and Slovenia will have 40 percent of the 112  Council Votes  in  the  EU-
20 and  consequently have  a  blocking  minority.  Thus,  there will  be a strong  political
demand  for structural and cohesion  policy.
As an alternative,  one could envision excluding the new members from cohesion  pol-
icy  (including  the  structural  funds)  for  an  interim  period.  This,  however,  would  be
difficult to justify because they then would  have an artificially  created  locational dis-
advantage relative to other European regions.
31.  As a consequence,  it is necessary to change the rules:
First,  one should clearly distinguish between the cohesion  fund and the structural
fund.  The  cohesion  fund,  according  to  article  130d,  is  intended  to  promote
convergence;  it  provides  transfers  in  the  areas  of  the  environment  and
transportation  infrastructure  to the four countries with  a per capita-GDP  of  below
90  percent  of the EU  average,  that  is  Greece,  Ireland,  Spain  and  Portugal  (with
Ireland  approaching  the  EU-average).  Since the cohesion  fund  is  directly  linked
to improving  the convergence conditions for monetary  union,  it should  not be  ex-
tended to  the  CEECs.  They  definitely will  need the  exchange  rate  as an  instru-
ment  for  adjustment  in  the  future  and  they  cannot  possibly  be  included  in  the
monetary  union soon. An  alternative would be to lower the required  percentage  to
70  percent  of the  EU-average.  This  would  exclude  Ireland,  Spain  and  Portugal
from the cohesion fund.
Of course, this may be the wishful thinking of an academic.  I am well  aware that a
currency  union  is associated with higher transfers;  thus it is  likely  that there  is  a
strong  political demand for cohesion finance.  In  any case, this  does not  apply  to
the  reform  countries  because they  will  remain  out  of the  monetary  union  for  a
long time.
- Second,  the structural  funds must  be  reformed.  The  structural funds  now  extend
to 50 percent of the EU-population  (the zone-1  criteria to 25 percent).  This clearly
shows that the  structural funds have degenerated  to  an all-encompassing  water-
ing  can,  having  lost  their  original  intent.  The  subsidiarity  principle  should  be
used:  This  means that regions  are helped  by nations, and nations are  helped by
the  union.  The  correct  way  to  implement  the  subsidiarity  principle  is  to
discontinue regional  support  by  Brussels completely.  Instead,  a  vertical  transfer
systems  from  the  EU  to  the  countries  should  be  intiated  with  the  individual
country  helping  its  regions.  Concomitantly,  the  structural  transfer  for  zone-1
should  be  nationalized.  Other  items  of structural  funds  (targets 2-5)  should  be
given up.
32.  This  still  leaves  the  question  of what  a  transfer  system  between  the  EU  and
individual nations should look like. With an enlarged  European  Union  of 20 or  even
more,  we  cannot possibly aim at a homogeneous  space in terms of GDP per capita.
It seems to me that in such a heterogenous  economic space a lower floor for income
per capita at 60-70 percent of the average must be accepted.
33.  During the  catching  up process  the absorption  capacity  of new  members  should
be taken  into account. Whereas  transfers are expected to be between  2-3 percent  of
GDP for Greece,  Ireland,  Portugal  and Spain  in  the  next years,  a  pure extension  of
the structural  funds would  imply 6,7  percent for the  CEFTA-5 (Deutsches  Institut fur
10Wirtschaftsforschung  1997).  This is likely to lead to a waste of resources;  thus  a cap
for transfers is required,  for instance a cap of 3  percent of GDP.
Decision  Making in an Enlarged Union
34.  The final issue is  decision making.  Enlargement  implies that it will  become  more
difficult to make decisions. According to Article 148,  there are three  different types of
majority:
If not stated otherwise,  the majority of votes of the Member States  is needed.  This
is 8 out of 15.
- For  a  qualified  majority  in  a  specific competence,  the  majority  of  the  weighted
votes of the Member States  is  required,  i.e. 62 out of 87  if the Council  acts  in  re-
sponse to  a Commission  proposal  (and  at  least the votes  of  10  Members  if the
Council  does not  respond to  the  Commission).  The allocation  of votes does  not
correspond to population in a strict sense.
Unanimity  is  required  in  the  areas  of  new  members,  taxation  and  fundamental
rules.  Of course,  the unanimity  principle  in the  area of taxation  is  at the heart  of
national  sovereignty  or  of  political  union.  Besides,  there  seems  to  be  a
consensus,  not  to  take  votes  and  to  continue  negotiation,  whenever  a  vital
interest of a member state is involved.
35.  In an enlarged European  union, the veto power that each country  has due to the
principle of unanimity becomes  a powerful  hindrance eventually meaning  that no de-
cision can  be taken  at all.  For qualified and  normal  majority,  the EU  becomes  more
heterogeneous.  The common  denominator gets smaller,  and  smaller eventually  be-
coming  meaningless.  Therefore,  the  institutional  framework  of decision  making  has
to be redesigned. This, however, will not be easy for a number of reasons.
First,  it is questioned whether  renouncing  on unanimity  would  ultimately  consoli-
date  the  integration  process  (Seidel  1997).  The  "optimum  majority  rule"  is  in-
tended to minimize  decision costs, i.e. the costs arising from the inability to reach
decisions as well as the costs of disregarding  the minority  interests of countries.
Thus, the longstanding debate on the pros and cons of the unanimity principle re-
flects  the  dilemma  of  European  decision-makers  who  are  caught  between  the
inefficiency of the consensus  principle  and  the  protection  of vital  national  inter-
ests.  A  second-best  solution  to  this  dilemma  may  be  the  introduction  of  the
"unanimity minus one rule".  In this model,  unanimity is  deemed to exist in spite of
the  veto  of one  Member  State.  It reflects  the  idea  that no  single  member  state
should be in a position to veto a unanimity-based decision (however, see below).
Second, Europe  does not have a constitution;  decisions with  a qualified majority
of the European  Council or a "unanimity minus  one rule" can  run into conflict with
national  constitutional  law in  areas of "vital  interest".  Thus,  it  is not  possible,  in
the  opinion  of  Germany's  Constitutional  Court,  to  legitimize  - in  a  sufficiently
democratic way - decisions of the  Council that have  been  adopted  against the
will of Germany. This position makes the rule "unanimity minus one" impossible.
Without  major  changes  in  the  democratic  legitimization  of the  European  decision
making  process  relating  to  the  role  of  the  European  parliament  and  a  European
"people" as a sovereign (Grimm  1997), the unanimity principle cannot be given up.
1136.  In  contrast  to  the  area  of  unanimity,  it  may  be  easier  to  find  a  solution  in  the
arena  of normal  and of qualified  majority.  Assuming  that  in  enlargement  the  alloca-
tion of new voting rights will follow the established pattern,  Poland  with  a population
of 40 million will have 8 votes (like Spain),  the Czech  Republic and  Hungary  5 votes
(like  Belgium),  the  Slovak Republic 4  votes  and  Slovenia  3  votes.  Altogether,  the
Visegrad-5 will have 25 votes out of 112  votes in the EU  Council.  Applying  the same
percentage for a  qualified majority as in the EU-15,  qualified  majority would  be at 80
votes with a blocking possible  by 33 votes.  In  order to make  decisions  possible, the
qualified majority will have to be put at a somewhat  lower percentage.
37.  A  mere  continuation  of the  current weighting  of votes  after  an  Eastern  enlarge-
ment  would  mean  that  Council  decisions  can  be  taken  by  a  qualified  majority  of
member  states against a minority of other member states  representing  a  majority of
the  European  population.  Thus,  the  next  intergovernmental  conference  cannot  do
otherwise than reweight  the votes  in the  Council.  Several  models  are  currently  dis-
cussed  to  this  end,  most  importantly  of  all the  introduction  of  a  so-called  "double
majority". According to this model,  for a majority decision to be  valid,  not only a  ma-
jority of states but also  a majority  of the  European  population  represented  by these
states would be necessary.
V.  Deepening  versus Enlargement
38.  In  a historical perspective,  deepening  of the  EU-institutions  in  the EU-15  should
be  a  vehicle to  promote  enlargement,  to  make  enlargement  more  likely  and  more
successful.  It should not be  a mechanism  to block enlargement.  After  all,  the vision
for  deepening  was conceived  in  the  eighties when  the  option  of enlargement  was
completely unrealistic.
Enlargement  of the  European  Union  is  a  grand  historic  opportunity,  a  chance  that
should  not be  missed.  This  holds from  a  purely economic  perspective,  it also  holds
in political terms.  Enlargement  secures freedom  to the peoples east of the Oder and
along the  Danube,  enlargement  is  instrumental  in  providing  economic  and  political
stability to Central  and Western  Europe.  A failure would perpetuate  a power vacuum
in  Central  Europe  (Baldwin  et  al.  1997),  it  would  have  severe  repercussions  for
Western Europe.
The  enlargement  of the  European  Union  is  one  of these  moments  when  history  is
rushing  by.  To  this  opportunity  Bismarck's  famous  sentence  can  be  applied:  "You
cannot  do  more  than wait  until  you feel  the  step  of God  in  history, and  then jump
forward and attempt to seize the tail-end of his coat".
12Table Al - Proportion of foreigners from  Central
eign population Germany,  in percent
and  Eastern  Europe  in  for-
1988  1993  1996
Poles  3.82  3.79  3.87
CSFR-Nationals  0.62  0.91  0.77
Hungarians  0.59  0.90  0.76
Rumanians  0.40  2.36  1.38
Bulgarians  0.10  0.82  0.49
CEEC-6  5.53  8.79  7.29
Russiansa  0.19  0.26  0.75
a1988:  Soviet Union
Source:  Statistisches Bundesamt;  eigene Berechnungen.
Table A2 - Allocation of Votesa  in the EU
Votes  Populationin  million
France  10  58,2
Germany  10  81,6
Great Britain  10  58,3
Italy  10  57,3
Spain  8  39,2
Belgium  5  10,1
Greece  5  10,2
Netherland  5  15,5
Portugal  5  9,9
Austria  4  8,1
Sweden  4  8,8
Denmark  3  5,2
Finland  3  5,1
Ireland  3  3,6
Luxembourg  2  0,4
87
size  of  existing
13
Allocations  of  votes  to  new  members  according  to  the  population
members,  see Baldwin et al.  1997.Table A3 - Qualified Majority
14
Votes  Qualified majority  in  percent of votes
votes
E U-12  76  58  76
EU-15  87  62  71
E U-20a  112  80  71
aAssuming the same percentage  as in EC-15.References
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